


# Attaques sur RSA

12345 – Prénom NOM

2022 / 2023 – *La ville*

# RSA



Utilisation : HTTPS, cartes bancaires, ...

# Plan

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# Problématique / Objectifs

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Pourquoi l'algorithme RSA est-il utilisé alors qu'il existe des attaques sur cet algorithme ?

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- 2 Étude et implémentation d'attaques sur RSA ;
- 3 Montrer que l'implémentation de RSA doit être faite avec précaution.

# Bases de RSA

## Étapes de l'utilisation de RSA

1 Génération des clés ;

# Bases de RSA

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- Clé publique :  $(e, n)$
- Clé privée :  $(d, n)$

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## Déchiffrement

Pour déchiffrer  $c$  :

$$m \equiv c^d \pmod{n}$$

Correction :  $c^d \equiv m^{ed} \equiv m^{k\varphi+1} \equiv m \pmod{n}$  par le théorème d'Euler.

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- Elle demande à Alice de déchiffrer  $c' \rightarrow m' \equiv c'^d \pmod{n}$
- Eve récupère le message :  $m \equiv m'r^{-1} \pmod{n}$

## Factorisation de $n$ avec $\varphi$

On a :

$$\begin{aligned} & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} n = pq \\ \varphi = (p-1)(q-1) \end{array} \right. \\ \Leftrightarrow & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} n = pq \\ \varphi = pq - p - q + 1 \end{array} \right. \\ \Leftrightarrow & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} pq = n \\ p + q = n - \varphi + 1 \end{array} \right. \\ \Leftrightarrow & p, q \text{ solutions de } x^2 - (n - \varphi + 1)x + n = 0 \end{aligned}$$

Il suffit donc de calculer les racines de  $x^2 - (n - \varphi + 1)x + n$

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## Attaque de Wiener – Notations

L'**attaque de Wiener** permet de récupérer la *clé privée* ( $d, n$ ) à partir de la *clé publique* ( $e, n$ ) sous certaines conditions :

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- $q < p < 2q$  ;
- $d < \frac{1}{3}n^{\frac{1}{4}}$ .

## Idée

On peut montrer que sous ces conditions,

$$\left| \frac{e}{n} - \frac{k}{d} \right| \leq \frac{1}{2d^2} \quad (1)$$

Où  $k = \frac{ed - 1}{\varphi}$ .

- Donc  $\frac{e}{n}$  est une *approximation* de  $\frac{k}{d}$
- On va pouvoir retrouver  $k$  et  $d$  à l'aide des *fractions continues*.

# Fractions continues I

Définition (*fraction continue*)

Une *fraction continue* est une fraction du type :

$$a_0 + \cfrac{1}{a_1 + \cfrac{1}{\ddots \cfrac{1}{a_{n-1} + \cfrac{1}{a_n}}}}$$

où  $a_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ , et  $\forall k \in \llbracket 1 ; n \rrbracket$ ,  $a_k \in \mathbb{N}^*$ .

On la note  $[a_0, \dots, a_n]$ .

## Fractions continues II

### Définition (*réduites*)

Soit  $f = [a_0, \dots, a_n]$  une fraction continue.

Soient :

$$\begin{cases} p_{-2} = 0 \\ p_{-1} = 1 \\ p_k = a_k p_{k-1} + p_{k-2} \end{cases} \quad \begin{cases} q_{-2} = 1 \\ q_{-1} = 0 \\ q_k = a_k q_{k-1} + q_{k-2} \end{cases}$$

Alors les *réduites* de  $f$  sont les fractions ( $k \in \llbracket 0 ; n \rrbracket$ ) :

$$\frac{p_k}{q_k}$$

# Fractions continues III

## Fraction continue d'un rationnel

Soient  $(a, b) \in \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{N}^*$ .

On peut calculer la fraction continue de  $\frac{a}{b}$  avec l'algorithme suivant :

```
1 def get_continued_fraction_rec(a, b, f=[]):
2     '''Return a ContinuedFraction object, the continued
3         fraction of a/b. This is a recursive function.'''
4
5     # euclidean division : a = bq + r
6     q = a // b
7     r = a % b
8
9     if r == 0:
10        return ContinuedFraction(f + [q])
11
12    return get_continued_fraction_rec(b, r, f + [q])
```

## Fractions continues IV

### Théorème

Soient  $a, a' \in \mathbb{Z}$ , et  $b, b' \in \mathbb{Z}^*$  tels que

$$\left| \frac{a}{b} - \frac{a'}{b'} \right| < \frac{1}{2b^2}$$

Alors  $\frac{a}{b}$  est une réduite de  $\frac{a'}{b'}$ .

→ On déduit donc de (1) que  $\frac{k}{d}$  est une réduite de  $\frac{e}{n}$ .

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- On calcule  $\varphi_i = \frac{e \cdot d_i - 1}{k_i}$  ;
- On essaye de factoriser  $n$  avec  $\varphi_i$ .

## Extension de l'attaque de Wiener

- On considère un  $d$  très grand : il va être "petit", négatif modulo  $\varphi$ .

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- On pose  $D = \varphi - d \equiv -d \ [\varphi]$
- $D$  satisfait les propriétés précédentes : on va pouvoir de nouveau réaliser l'attaque, avec

$$\varphi_i = \frac{e \cdot d_i + 1}{k_i}$$

# Résultats

```
6. Testing Wiener's attack :  
Key generation for Wiener's attack (2048 bits) ...  
Key generated in 0:00:15.661398s.  
Wiener's attack finished in 0:00:00.077236s.  
Correct result !  
-----  
7. Testing Wiener's attack with a large private exponent :  
Key generation for Wiener's attack (2048 bits) ...  
Key generated in 0:00:09.696836s.  
Wiener's attack finished in 0:00:00.077087s.  
Correct result !
```

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## Attaque de Håstad – Notations

Alice envoie un même message  $m$  à  $p$  destinataires ayant le même exposant de chiffrement :

$$(S) \quad \begin{cases} c_1 & \equiv m^e [n_1] \\ & \vdots \\ c_p & \equiv m^e [n_p] \end{cases}$$

On suppose que tous les modules ont la même taille  $s$   
 $(\forall k \in \llbracket 1 ; p \rrbracket, \log_2(n_k) \approx s)$ . Généralement,  $s = 2048$ .

L'**attaque de Håstad** va permettre de récupérer le message  $m$  sous certaines conditions.

# Solution au système

Par le théorème des restes chinois,

$$(S) \Leftrightarrow m^e \equiv \sum_{k=1}^p c_k N_k M_k [N]$$

où  $\forall k \in \llbracket 1 ; p \rrbracket$  :

$$\blacksquare N = \prod_{k=1}^p n_k$$

$$\blacksquare N_k = \frac{N}{n_k}$$

$$\blacksquare M_k \equiv N_k^{-1} [n_k]$$

## Condition sur le nombre d'équations $p$

Pour retrouver le message, on a besoin que  $m^e < N$ .

$$\text{Or } N = \prod_{k=1}^p n_k \approx 2^{sp}$$

Donc il faut que

$$p > \frac{e}{s} \log_2(m)$$

$m \leq 2^s - 1$ , donc dans le cas général,  $p > e$ .

# Résultats

```
4. Testing Hastad's attack (e = 5) :
```

```
Number of equations actually needed to recover the message : 2.
```

```
Key generation for Hastad's attack (2048 bits, 2 keys) ...
```

```
1/2 generated in 0:00:07.160342s.
```

```
2/2 generated in 0:00:02.721468s.
```

```
Done in 0:00:09.881926s.
```

```
Hastad attack ...
```

```
Attack done in 0:00:00.113410s.
```

```
Input and output are identical.
```

```
5. Testing Hastad's attack, testing the limit number of equations needed (e = 5, random  
message of length 100 characters) :
```

```
Number of equations theoretically needed to recover the message : 3.
```

```
Key generation for Hastad's attack (2048 bits) ...
```

```
1/3 generated in 0:00:06.413951s.
```

```
2/3 generated in 0:00:07.811984s.
```

```
3/3 generated in 0:00:19.650791s.
```

```
Done in 0:00:33.876816s.
```

```
Hastad attack with 3 equations ...
```

```
Attack done in 0:00:00.350084s.
```

```
Attack succeeded : message correctly recovered.
```

```
Hastad attack with 2 equations ...
```

```
Attack done in 0:00:00.203013s.
```

```
Attack failed : message not correctly recovered. So the limit is correct.
```

# Nécessité d'un schéma de remplissage (*padding scheme*)

## Problèmes :

- L'algorithme RSA est **déterministe** : tel quel, il n'est donc pas *sémantiquement sûr*.

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
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- Si  $e$  et  $m$  sont trop petits, on peut retrouver le message clair sans la clé privée (si  $m^e < n$ ).

→ Il faut donc utiliser un schéma de remplissage.

# Le padding OAEP



**Encodage :**

$$X = \overbrace{m0 \cdots 0}^{k_1} \oplus G(r)$$
$$Y = r \oplus H(X)$$

**Décodage :**

$$r = Y \oplus H(X)$$
$$m0 \cdots 0 = X \oplus G(r)$$

[https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optimal\\_Asymmetric\\_Encryption\\_Padding](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optimal_Asymmetric_Encryption_Padding)

# Conclusion

- L'utilisation d'un *padding* randomisé permet de se prémunir de l'attaque de Håstad ;
- Dans l'implémentation de la génération des clés, il faut vérifier que  $d$  n'est pas dans les conditions de l'attaque de Wiener.

**Merci pour votre attention**

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# Preuve de correction de l'algorithme RSA

## Théorème d'Euler

$\forall n \in \mathbb{N}^*, \forall a \in [\![1 ; n]\!] \mid a \wedge n = 1$ , on a :

$$a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \ [n]$$

Comme  $ed \equiv 1 \ [\varphi]$ ,  $\exists k \in \mathbb{N} \mid ed = k\varphi + 1$ .

Donc on a :

$$\boxed{c^d} \equiv m^{ed} \equiv m^{k\varphi+1} \equiv \boxed{m} \ [n]$$

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# Théorème des restes chinois

Théorème des restes chinois :

Soient  $p \in \mathbb{N}^*$  et  $(n_k)_{k \in [\![1 ; p]\!]} \in (\mathbb{N}^* \setminus \{1\})^p$  tels que

$$\forall i, j \in [\![1 ; p]\!], \quad i \neq j \Rightarrow n_i \wedge n_j = 1$$

Avec  $N = \prod_{k=1}^p n_k$ , on a que :

$$\begin{aligned} \psi & : \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z} \longrightarrow \prod_{k=1}^p \mathbb{Z}/n_k\mathbb{Z} \\ cl_N(x) & \longmapsto (cl_{n_1}(x), \dots, cl_{n_p}(x)) \end{aligned}$$

est un isomorphisme d'anneaux.

# Preuve de l'attaque de Håstad I

On détermine  $\psi^{-1}$  :

$$\begin{aligned} & \psi^{-1}((cl_{a_1}(c_1), \dots, cl_{a_n}(c_n))) \\ = & \psi^{-1}\left(\sum_{k=1}^n c_k (cl_{a_1}(0), \dots, cl_{a_{k-1}}(0), cl_{a_k}(1), cl_{a_{k+1}}(0), \dots, cl_{a_n}(0))\right) \\ = & \sum_{k=1}^n c_k \underbrace{\psi^{-1} (cl_{a_1}(0), \dots, cl_{a_{k-1}}(0), cl_{a_k}(1), cl_{a_{k+1}}(0), \dots, cl_{a_n}(0))}_{cl_a(m_k)} \\ = & \sum_{k=0}^n c_k cl_a(m_k) \end{aligned}$$

## Preuve de l'attaque de Håstad II

Il suffit de trouver des  $m_k$  qui conviennent, c'est à dire tels que :

$$\forall k \in \llbracket 1 ; n \rrbracket, \begin{cases} m_k \in \mathbb{Z} \\ \forall i \in \llbracket 1 ; n \rrbracket \setminus \{k\}, m_k \equiv 0 [a_i] \\ m_k \equiv 1 [a_k] \end{cases}$$

$$\text{Soit } A = \prod_{k=1}^n a_k, \text{ et } \forall k \in \llbracket 1 ; n \rrbracket, A_k = \frac{A}{a_k}$$

Comme les  $a_k$  sont deux à deux premiers entre eux,

$\forall k \in \llbracket 1 ; n \rrbracket, A_k \wedge a_k = 1$ , donc avec le théorème de Bézout :

$$\exists B_k, b_k \in \mathbb{Z} \mid A_k B_k + a_k b_k = 1$$

$$(B_k \equiv (A_k)^{-1} [a_k])$$

## Preuve de l'attaque de Håstad III

Soient  $\forall k \in \llbracket 1 ; n \rrbracket$ ,  $m_k = A_k B_k \in \mathbb{Z}$ .

On a,  $\forall k \in \llbracket 1 ; n \rrbracket$  :

$$m_k \equiv A_k B_k \equiv 1 - a_k b_k \equiv 1 [a_k]$$

et  $\forall i \in \llbracket 1 ; n \rrbracket \setminus \{k\}$  :

$$m_k \equiv A_k B_k \equiv 0 [a_i]$$

car  $a_i | A_k$ .

Donc finalement :

$$\psi^{-1} (cl_{a_1}(c_1), \dots, cl_{a_n}(c_n)) = \sum_{k=1}^n c_k cl_a(A_k B_k)$$

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## Preuve de l'attaque de Wiener I

Comme  $ed \equiv 1 [\varphi]$ ,  $\exists k \in \mathbb{N} \mid ed - k\varphi = 1$ , donc :

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{ed - k\varphi}{d\varphi} &= \frac{1}{d\varphi} \\ \Rightarrow \quad \frac{e}{\varphi} - \frac{k}{d} &= \frac{1}{d\varphi} \\ \Rightarrow \quad \left| \frac{e}{\varphi} - \frac{k}{d} \right| &= \frac{1}{d\varphi}\end{aligned}$$

Donc  $\frac{k}{d}$  est une approximation de  $\frac{e}{\varphi}$ .

On peut essayer d'approximer  $\varphi$  avec  $n$  :

$$\varphi = \phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1) = n - p - q + 1$$

## Preuve de l'attaque de Wiener II

Comme  $\begin{cases} p < 2q \\ q < p \end{cases}$  (par hypothèse), on a :

$$\begin{cases} p + q < 3q \\ q^2 < pq = n \end{cases} \Rightarrow \begin{cases} p + q < 3q \\ q < \sqrt{n} \end{cases} \Rightarrow p + q < 3\sqrt{n} \Rightarrow p + q - 1 < 3\sqrt{n}$$

Donc  $|n - \varphi| = |p + q - 1| < 3\sqrt{n}$ .

On a ensuite :

## Preuve de l'attaque de Wiener III

$$\begin{aligned}\left| \frac{e}{n} - \frac{k}{d} \right| &= \left| \frac{ed - nk}{nd} \right| \\ &= \left| \frac{ed - k\varphi + k\varphi - nk}{nd} \right| \\ &= \left| \frac{1 - k(n - \varphi)}{nd} \right| \\ &< \frac{1 + |k(n - \varphi)|}{|nd|} \\ &\leqslant \left| \frac{k(n - \varphi)}{nd} \right| \leqslant \left| \frac{3k\sqrt{n}}{nd} \right| = \frac{3k}{d\sqrt{n}}.\end{aligned}$$

## Preuve de l'attaque de Wiener IV

Ensuite,  $k\varphi = ed - 1 < ed$  et  $e < \varphi$ , donc  $k < \frac{e}{\varphi}d < d$ , donc :

$$k < d < \frac{1}{3}n^{\frac{1}{4}} \Rightarrow \frac{k}{d} < 1 < \frac{n^{\frac{1}{4}}}{3d}$$

Donc :

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \frac{e}{n} - \frac{k}{d} \right| &\leqslant \frac{k}{d} \frac{3}{\sqrt{n}} \\ &\leqslant \frac{n^{\frac{1}{4}}}{3d} \frac{3}{\sqrt{n}} \\ &= \frac{1}{dn^{\frac{1}{4}}} \end{aligned}$$

# Preuve de l'attaque de Wiener V

Et :

$$2d^2 < \frac{2}{3}dn^{\frac{1}{4}} < dn^{\frac{1}{4}} \Rightarrow \frac{3}{2dn^{\frac{1}{4}}} < \frac{1}{2d^2}$$

D'où :

$$\left| \frac{e}{n} - \frac{k}{d} \right| \leq \frac{1}{dn^{\frac{1}{4}}} \leq \frac{1}{2d^2}$$

# Plan

## 1 Introduction

## 2 Bases de RSA

## 3 Attaques

- Premières attaques

- Attaque de Wiener

- Attaque de Håstad

## 4 Schéma de remplissage

## 5 Conclusion

## 6 Annexes

- Correction de RSA


- Preuve de l'attaque de Håstad

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### ■ Structure du code

- Code

# Structure du code



# Plan

## 1 Introduction

## 2 Bases de RSA

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## 6 Annexes

- Correction de RSA

- Preuve de l'attaque de Håstad

- Preuve de l'attaque de Wiener

- Structure du code

### ■ Code

## main.py |

```
1  #!/bin/python3
2  # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
3
4  '''Main file running tests on the attacks'''
5
6  ##- Import
7  from modules.test_attacks import *
8
9  from datetime import datetime as dt
10 from sys import argv
11 from sys import exit as sysexit
12
13 ##- Run tests function
14 def run_tests(size=2048):
15     '''Run the tests defined in the file 'test_attacks.py'.
16     '''
17     passed = []
18
```

## main.py ||

```
19     t0 = dt.now()
20
21     try:
22         print('Launching tests...')
23         print('-' * 16)
24
25         print('1. Testing factorisation of the modulus with')
26         print('the private exponent :')
27         passed.append(test_mod_fact(size))
28         print('-' * 16)
29
30         print('2. Testing common modulus (finding the')
31         print('private exponent knowing a key set with the same')
32         print('exponent) :')
33         passed.append(test_common_mod(size))
34         print('-'*16)
35
36         print('3. Testing multiplicative attack :')
37         passed.append(test_multiplicative_attack(size))
```

## main.py |||

```
35         print('-'*16)
36
37         print('4. Testing Hastad\'s attack (e = 5) :')
38         passed.append(test_hastad(msg='Testing this attack
with this message, because a message is needed.', size=
size, e=5))
39         print('-'*16)
40
41         print('5. Testing Hastad\'s attack, testing the
limit number of equations needed (e = 5, random message
of length 100 characters) :')
42         passed.append(test_hastad_message_size(size=size, e
=5))
43         print('-'*16)
44
45         print('6. Testing Wiener\'s attack :')
46         passed.append(test_wiener(size=size))
47         print('-'*16)
```

## main.py |V

```
49     print('7. Testing Wiener\'s attack with a large')
  private exponent :')
50     passed.append(test_wiener(size=size, large=True))
51     print('-'*16)
52
53     print(f'\nDone in {dt.now() - t0}s.')
54
55 except KeyboardInterrupt:
56     print(f'\nStopped. Time elapsed : {dt.now() - t0}s.\nNumber of tests done : {len(passed)}')
57
58 if not False in passed:
59     print('\nAll tests passed correctly !')
60
61 else:
62     print('\nThe following tests failed :')
63
64     for k, b in enumerate(passed):
65         if not b:
```

## main.py V

```
66                     print(f'\t{k + 1},')
67
68 ## - Run
69 if __name__ == '__main__':
70     if len(argv) == 1:
71         size = 2048
72
73     else:
74         try:
75             size = int(argv[1])
76
77         except:
78             print(f'Wrong argument at position 1 : should be
    the RSA key size (in bits).\nExample : "{argv[0]}
2048".')
79             sysexit()
80
81 run_tests(size)
```

## arithmetic.py |

```
1  #!/bin/python3
2  # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
3
4  '''Useful arithmetic functions'''
5
6  ##- Imports
7  from random import randint
8  from math import floor, ceil, sqrt, isqrt
9  from fractions import Fraction
10 from gmpy2 import is_square
11
12
13 ##- Multiplicative inverse
14 def mult_inverse(a: int, n: int) -> int:
15     """
16         Return the multiplicative inverse u of a modulo n.
17         u*a = 1 modulo n
18     """
19
```

## arithmetic.py ||

```
20     (old_r, r) = (a, n)
21     (old_u, u) = (1, 0)
22
23     while r != 0:
24         q = old_r // r
25         (old_r, r) = (r, old_r - q*r)
26         (old_u, u) = (u, old_u - q*u)
27
28     if old_r > 1:
29         raise ValueError(str(a) + ' is not invertible in the
30                           ring Z/' + str(n) + 'Z.')
31
32     if old_u < 0:
33         return old_u + n
34
35     else:
36         return old_u
37
```

## arithmetic.py III

```
38  ##-Max parity
39  def max_parity(n):
40      '''return (t, r) such that n = 2^t * r, where r is odd
41      '''
42
43      t = 0
44      r = int(n)
45      while r % 2 == 0 and r > 1:
46          r //= 2
47          t += 1
48
49
50
51  ##-Probabilistic prime test
52  def isSurelyPrime(n):
53      '''Check if n is probably prime. Uses Miller Rabin test.
54      '''


```

## arithmetic.py |V

```
55     if n == 2:
56         return True
57
58     elif n % 2 == 0:
59         return False
60
61     return miller_rabin(n, 15)
62
63
64 def miller_rabin_witness(a, d, s, n):
65     """
66     Return True if a is a Miller-Rabin witness.
67
68     - a : the base ;
69     - d : odd integer verifying  $n - 1 = 2^s d$  ;
70     - s : positive integer verifying  $n - 1 = 2^s d$  ;
71     - n : the odd integer to test primality.
72     """
73
```

## arithmetic.py √

```
74     r = pow(a, d, n)
75
76     if r == 1 or r == n - 1:
77         return False
78
79     for k in range(s):
80         r = r**2 % n
81
82         if r == n - 1:
83             return False
84
85     return True
86
87
88 def miller_rabin(n, k=15) :
89     """
90     Return the primality of n using Miller-Rabin
91     probabilistic primality test.
```

## arithmetic.py VI

```
92     - n : odd integer to test the primality ;
93     - k : number of tests (Error = 4^(-k)).
94     , ,
95
96     if n in (0, 1):
97         return False
98
99     if n == 2:
100        return True
101
102    s, d = max_parity(n - 1)
103
104    for i in range(k) :
105        a = randint(2, n - 1)
106
107        if miller_rabin_witness(a, d, s, n):
108            return False
109
110    return True
```

## arithmetic.py VII

```
111
112
113 ## - iroot
114 def iroot(n, k):
115     """
116     Newton's method to find the integer k-th root of n.
117
118     Return floor(n^(1/k))
119     """
120
121     u, s = n, n + 1
122
123     while u < s:
124         s = u
125         t = (k - 1) * s + n // pow(s, k - 1)
126         u = t // k
127
128     return s
129
```

## arithmetic.py VIII

```
130
131
132 ##-Fermat factorisation
133 def fermat_factor(n):
134     """
135     Try to factor n using Fermat's factorisation.
136     For n = pq, works better if |q - p| is small, i.e if p
137     and q
138     are near sqrt(n).
139     """
140
141     a = iroot(n, 2)
142
143     while not is_square(pow(a, 2) - n):
144         a += 1
145
146         if pow(a, 2) - n <= 0:
147             return False
```

## arithmetic.py |X

```
148     b = isqrt(pow(a, 2) - n)
149     return (a - b, a + b)
150
151
152 ##-Continued fractions
153 class ContinuedFraction:
154     '''Class representing a continued fraction.'''
155
156     def __init__(self, f):
157         ,
158         Initialize the class
159
160         - f : the int array representing the continued
161         fraction.
162         ,
163
164         if type(f) in (set, list):
165             self.f = list(f)
```

## arithmetic.py X

```
166     else:
167         raise ValueError('ContinuedFraction: error: `f`'
168                           'should be a list')
169
170     if len(f) == 0:
171         raise ValueError('ContinuedFraction: error: `f`'
172                           'should not be empty')
173
174     for j, k in enumerate(f):
175         if type(k) != int:
176             raise ValueError(f'ContinuedFraction: error:
177                               `f` should be a list of int, but `{k}` found at
178                               position {j}')
179
179
177     def __repr__(self):
178         '''Return a pretty string representing the fraction.
179         ,,
179
```

## arithmetic.py Xl

```
180     ret = f'{self.f[-1]},  
181  
182     for k in reversed(self.f[:-1]):  
183         ret = f'{k} + 1/({} + ret + {})',  
184  
185     return ret  
186  
187  
188     def __eq__(self, other):  
189         '''Test the equality between self and the other.'''  
190  
191         return self.f == other.f  
192  
193  
194     def eval_rec(self):  
195         '''Return the evaluation of self.f via a recursive  
function.'''  
196  
197         return self._eval_rec(self.f)
```

## arithmetic.py XII

```
198
199
200     def _eval_rec(self, f_):
201         '''The recursive function.'''
202
203         if len(f_) == 1:
204             return f_[0]
205
206         return f_[0] + 1/(self._eval_rec(f_[1:]))
207
208
209     def truncate(self, pos):
210         '''
211             Return a ContinuedFraction truncated at position `pos` from self.f.
212
213             - pos : the position of the truncation. The element
214             at position `pos` is kept in the result.
215         '''
```

## arithmetic.py XIII

```
215         return ContinuedFraction(self.f[:pos + 1])
216
217
218
219     def get_convergents(self):
220         """
221             Return two lists, p, q which represents the
222             convergents :
223                 the n-th convergent is 'p[n] / q[n]'.
224
225         p = [0]*(len(self.f) + 2)
226         q = [0]*(len(self.f) + 2)
227
228         p[-1] = 1
229         q[-2] = 1
230
231         for k in range(0, len(self.f)):
232             p[k] = self.f[k] * p[k - 1] + p[k - 2]
```

## arithmetic.py XIV

```
233         q[k] = self.f[k] * q[k - 1] + q[k - 2]
234
235     return p, q
236
237
238     def eval_(self):
239         '''Return the evaluation of self.f.'''
240
241     p, q = self.get_convergents()
242
243     return p[len(self.f) - 1] / q[len(self.f) - 1]
244
245
246     def get_nth_convergent(self, n):
247         '''Return the convergent at the index n.'''
248
249     if n >= len(self.f):
```

## arithmetic.py XV

```
250             raise ValueError(f'ContinuedFraction:  
251     get_nth_convergent: n cannot be greater than {len(self.f)  
252     ) - 1}')
```

```
253  
254     p, q = self.get_convergents()  
255  
256  
257  
258     def get_continued_fraction(a, b):  
259         '''Return a ContinuedFraction object, the continued  
260         fraction of a/b.'''  
261  
262         f = []  
263         d = Fraction(a, b)  
264         f.append(floor(d))  
265  
266         while d - floor(d) != 0:
```

## arithmetic.py XVI

```
266         d = 1/(d - floor(d))
267         f.append(floor(d))
268
269     return ContinuedFraction(f)
270
271
272 def get_continued_fraction_real(x):
273     """
274     Return a ContinuedFraction object, the continued
275     fraction of x.
276     Note that there can be errors because of the float
277     precision with this function.
278     """
279
280     f = []
281
282     d = x
283     f.append(floor(x))
```

## arithmetic.py XVII

```
283     while d - floor(d) != 0:
284         d = 1/(d - floor(d))
285         f.append(floor(d))
286
287     return ContinuedFraction(f)
288
289
290 def get_continued_fraction_rec(a, b, f=[]):
291     '''Return a ContinuedFraction object, the continued
292     fraction of a/b. This is a recursive function.'''
293
294     # euclidean division : a = bq + r
295     q = a // b
296     r = a % b
297
298     if r == 0:
299         return ContinuedFraction(f + [q])
300
301     return get_continued_fraction_rec(b, r, f + [q])
```

## arithmetic.py XVIII

```
301
302
303 ##- Tests
304 if __name__ == '__main__':
305     if False:
306         n = int(input('number :\n'))
307         p, q = fermat_factor(n)
308         print('Result : {}\\np = {}'.format(p*q == n, p))
```

## base.py |

```
1  #!/bin/python3
2  # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
3
4  '''Miscellaneous and useful functions'''
5
6  ##- Imports
7  import hashlib
8
9
10 ##- Split function
11 def split(txt, size, pad_=None):
12     """
13         Return a list representing txt by groups of size 'size'.
14
15         - txt : the text to split ;
16         - size : the block size ;
17         - pad_ : if not None, pad the last block with 'pad_' to
18             be 'size' length (adding to the end).
19     """
```

## base.py ||

```
19
20     l = []
21
22     for k in range(len(txt) // size + 1):
23         p = txt[k*size : (k+1)*size]
24
25         if p in ('', b''):
26             break
27
28         if pad_ != None:
29             p = pad(p, size, pad_)
30
31         l.append(p)
32
33     return l
34
35
36 def pad(txt, size, pad=b'', end=True):
37     ''',
```

## base.py |||

```
38     Pad 'txt' to make it 'size' long.  
39     If len(txt) > size, it just returns 'txt'.  
40  
41     - txt : the string to pad ;  
42     - size : the final wanted size ;  
43     - pad : the character to use to pad ;  
44     - end : if True, add to the end, otherwise add to the  
beginning.  
45     ''',  
46  
47     while len(txt) < size:  
48         if end:  
49             txt += pad  
50  
51         else:  
52             txt = pad + txt  
53  
54     return txt  
55
```

## base.py |V

```
56
57     ##-Mask generation function
58     # From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
59     # Mask_generation_function
60
61     def i2osp(integer: int, size: int = 4) -> str:
62         return int.to_bytes(integer % 256**size, size, 'big')
63
64     def mgf1(input_str: bytes, length: int, hash_func=hashlib.
65             sha256) -> str:
66         '''Mask generation function.'''
67
68         counter = 0
69         output = b''
70         while len(output) < length:
71             C = i2osp(counter, 4)
72             output += hash_func(input_str + C).digest()
73             counter += 1
74
75         return output[:length]
```

## base.py V

```
73
74
75     ## -Xor
76     def xor(s1, s2):
77         '''Return s1 xored with s2 bit per bit.'''
78
79         if (len(s1) != len(s2)):
80             raise ValueError('Strings are not of the same length
81 .')
82
83         if type(s1) != bytes:
84             s1 = s1.encode()
85
86         if type(s2) != bytes:
87             s2 = s2.encode()
88
89         l = [i ^ j for i, j in zip(list(s1), list(s2))]
90
91         return bytes(l)
```

## base.py VI

```
91
92
93 ##- Int and bytes
94 def int_to_bytes(x: int) -> bytes:
95     return x.to_bytes((x.bit_length() + 7) // 8, 'little')
96
97 def bytes_to_int(xbytes: bytes) -> int:
98     return int.from_bytes(xbytes, 'little')
99
100
101 ##- Other
102 def str_diff(s1, s2, verbose=True, max_len=80):
103     """
104     Show difference between strings (or numbers) s1 and s2.
105     Return s1 == s2.
106
107     - s1          : input string to compare ;
108     - s2          : output string to compare ;
```

## base.py VII

```
108     - verbose : if True, show input and output message and
109       where they differ if so ;
110     - max_len : don't show messages if their length is more
111       than max_len. Default is 80. If negative, always show
112       them.
113     ''
114
115     s1 = str(s1)
116     s2 = str(s2)
117
118     if verbose:
119         if len(s1) <= max_len or max_len == -1:
120             print(f'\nEntry message : {s1}')
121             print(f'Output          : {s2}')
122
123         for k in range(len(s1)):
124             if s1[k] != s2[k]:
125                 if len(s1) <= max_len or max_len == -1:
```

## base.py VIII

```
123     print(' '*(len('Output' : ) + k)
+ '^-')
124
125         print('Input and output differ from position
126             {}'.format(k))
127
128         return False
129
130         print('Input and output are identical.')
131
132
133
134     ## - Testing
135     if __name__ == '__main__':
136         msg = input('msg\n>').encode()
137
138         print(mgf1(msg, 10).hex())
139         print(xor('test', 'abcd'))
```

# base.py |X

## RSA.py |

```
1  #!/bin/python3
2  # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
3
4  '''Implementation of RSA cipher and key management'''
5
6  ##- Imports
7  try:
8      from arithmetic import *
9      from base import *
10
11 except ModuleNotFoundError:
12     from modules.arithmetic import *
13     from modules.base import *
14
15 from secrets import randbits
16 from random import randint, randbytes
17 import math
18
19 import base64
```

## RSA.py //

```
20
21 ## - RsaKeys
22 class RsaKey:
23     '''RSA key object'''
24
25     def __init__(self, e=None, d=None, n=None, phi=None, p=
26 None, q=None):
27         '''
28         - e : public exponent
29         - d : private exponent
30         - n : modulus
31         - p, q : primes that verify pq = n
32         - phi = (p - 1)(q - 1)
33
34         self.e = e
35         self.d = d
36         self.n = n
37         self.phi = phi
```

## RSA.py |||

```
38         self.p = p
39         self.q = q
40
41         self.is_private = self.d != None
42
43     if self.is_private:
44         if self.q < self.p:
45             self.p = q
46             self.q = p
47
48         self.pb = (e, n)
49         if self.is_private:
50             self.pv = (d, n)
51
52         self.size = None
53
54     def __repr__(self):
55         if self.is_private:
```

## RSA.py |V

```
56         return f'RsaKey private key :\n\tsize : {self.\nsize}\n\tte : {self.e}\n\ttd : {self.d}\n\ttn : {self.n}\n\tphi : {self.phi}\n\tpp : {self.p}\n\tqq : {self.q}\n\n57     else:\n58         return f'RsaKey public key :\n\tsize : {self.\nsize}\n\tte : {self.e}\n\ttn : {self.n}\n\n60\n61\n62     def __eq__(self, other):\n63         '''Return True if the key are of the same type (\npublic / private) and have the same values.'''\n64\n65         ret = self.is_private == other.is_private\n66\n67         if not ret:\n68             return False\n69\n70         if self.is_private:
```

## RSA.py V

```
71         ret = ret and (
72             self.e == other.e and
73             self.d == other.d and
74             self.n == other.n and
75             self.phi == other.phi
76         )
77
78         ret = ret and ((self.p == other.p and self.q ==
79                         other.q) or (self.q == other.p and self.p ==
80                         other.q))
81
82     else:
83         ret = ret and (
84             self.e == other.e and
85             self.n == other.d
86         )
87
88
89     return ret
```

## RSA.py VI

```
89     def public(self):
90         '''Return the public key associated to self in an
91         other RsaKey object.'''
92
93         k = RsaKey(e=self.e, n=self.n)
94         k.size = self.size
95         return k
96
97     def _gen_nb(self, size=2048, wiener=False):
98         '''
99             Generates p, q, and set attributes p, q, phi, n,
100            size.
101
102            - size : the bit size of n ;
103            - wiener : If True, generates p, q prime such that q
104            < p < 2q.
105        '''
```

## RSA.py VII

```
105     self.p, self.q = 1, 1
106
107     while not isSurelyPrime(self.q):
108         self.q = randbits(size // 2)
109
110     while not (isSurelyPrime(self.p) and ((wiener and
111         self.q < self.p < 2 * self.q) or (not wiener))):
112         self.p = randbits(size // 2)
113
114     self.phi = (self.p - 1) * (self.q - 1)
115     self.n = self.p * self.q
116
117     self.size = size
118
119     def new(self, size=2048):
120         """
121             Generate RSA keys of size 'size' bits.
```

## RSA.py VIII

```
122     If self.e != None, it keeps it (and ensures that gcd
123     (phi, e) = 1).
124
125     - size : the key size, in bits.
126     '',
127
128     self._gen_nb(size)
129
130     while self.e != None and math.gcd(self.e, self.phi)
131     != 1:
132         self._gen_nb(size)
133
134     if self.e == None:
135         self.e = 0
136         while math.gcd(self.e, self.phi) != 1:
137             self.e = randint(max(self.p, self.q), self.
138                             phi)
```

## RSA.py |X

```
137         elif math.gcd(self.e, self.phi) != 1: #Not possible
138             raise ValueError('RsaKey: new: error: gcd(self.e
139 , self.phi) != 1')
140             self.d = mult_inverse(self.e, self.phi)
141             self.is_private = True
142             self.pb = (self.e, self.n)
143             self.pv = (self.d, self.n)
144             self.size = size
145
146
147
148
149
150     def new_wiener(self, size=2048):
151         """
152             Generate RSA keys of size 'size' bits.
153             If self.e != None, it does NOT keeps it.
```

## RSA.py X

```
154     These key are generated so that the Wiener's attack
155     is possible on them.
156
157     - size : the key size, in bits.
158     , ,
159
160     self._gen_nb(size, wiener=True)
161
162     self.d = 0
163     while math.gcd(self.d, self.phi) != 1:
164         self.d = randint(1, math.floor(sqrt(sqrt(self.
165             n))/3))
166
167         self.e = mult_inverse(self.d, self.phi)
168
169         self.is_private = True
170
171         self.pb = (self.e, self.n)
172         self.pv = (self.d, self.n)
```

## RSA.py XI

```
171         self.size = size
172
173
174
175     def new_wiener_large(self, size=2048, only_large=True):
176         """
177             Same as 'self.new_wiener', but 'd' can be very large
178
179             - size      : the RSA key size ;
180             - only_large : if False, d can be small, or large,
181             and otherwise, d is large.
182         """
183
184
185         self._gen_nb(size, wiener=True)
186
187         self.d = 0
188         while math.gcd(self.d, self.phi) != 1:
189             if only_large:
```

## RSA.py XII

```
188             #ceil(sqrt(6)) = 3
189             self.d = randint(int(self.phi - iroot(self.n
190 , 4) // 3), self.phi)
191
192         else:
193             self.d = randint(1, self.phi)
194             if iroot(self.n, 4) / 3 < self.d or self.d <
self.phi - iroot(self.n, 4) / math.sqrt(6):
195                 self.d = 0 #go to the next iteration
196
197             self.e = mult_inverse(self.d, self.phi)
198             self.is_private = True
199             self.pb = (self.e, self.n)
200             self.pv = (self.d, self.n)
201
202             self.size = size
203
204
```

## RSA.py XIII

```
205     ##-Padding
206     class OAEP:
207         '''Class implementing OAEP padding'''
208
209     def __init__(self, block_size, k0=None, k1=0):
210         """
211             Initiate OAEP class.
212
213             - block_size : the bit size of each block ;
214             - k0          : integer (number of bits in the
215                 random part). If None, it is set to block_size // 8 ;
216             - k1          : integer such that len(block) +
217                 k0 + k1 = block_size. Default is 0.
218
219             self.block_size = block_size #n
220
221             if k0 == None:
222                 k0 = block_size // 8
```

## RSA.py XIV

```
222
223     self.k0 = k0
224     self.k1 = k1
225
226
227     def _encode_block(self, block):
228         """
229         Encode a block.
230
231         - block : an n - k0 - k1 long bytes string.
232         """
233
234         #---Add k1 \0 to block
235         block += (b'\0')*self.k1
236
237         #---Generate r, a k0 bits random string
238         r = randbytes(self.k0)
239
240         X = xor(block, mgf1(r, self.block_size - self.k0))
```

## RSA.py XV

```
241
242     Y = xor(r, mgf1(X, self.k0))
243
244     return X + Y
245
246
247     def encode(self, txt):
248         """
249         Encode txt
250
251         Entry :
252             - txt : the string text to encode.
253
254         Output :
255             bytes list
256         """
257
258         if type(txt) != bytes:
259             txt = txt.encode()
```

## RSA.py XVI

```
260
261     --- Cut message in blocks of size n - k0 - k1
262     blocks = []
263     l = self.block_size - self.k0 - self.k1
264
265     blocks = split(txt, l, pad_=b'\0')
266
267     --- Encode blocks
268     enc = []
269     for k in blocks:
270         enc.append(self._encode_block(k))
271
272     return enc
273
274
275     def _decode_block(self, block):
276         ''Decode a block encoded with self._encode_block.
277         , , ,
```

## RSA.py XVII

```
278     X = block[:self.block_size - self.k0]
279     Y = block[-self.k0:]
280
281     r = xor(Y, mgf1(X, self.k0))
282
283     txt = xor(X, mgf1(r, self.block_size - self.k0))
284
285     while txt[-1] == 0: #Remove padding
286         txt = txt[:-1]
287
288     return txt
289
290
291 def decode(self, enc):
292     """
293     Decode a text encoded with self.encode.
294
295     - enc : a list of bytes encoded blocks.
296     """
```

## RSA.py XVIII

```
297
298     txt = b''
299
300     for k in enc:
301         txt += self._decode_block(k)
302
303     return txt
304
305
306
307 # - RSA
308 class RSA:
309     '''RSA cipher'''
310
311     def __init__(self, key, padding, block_size=None):
312         """
313             - key           : a RsaKey object ;
314             - padding       : the padding to use. Possible values
315             are :
```

## RSA.py XIX

```
315         'int' : msg is an int, return an int ;
316         'raw' : msg is a string, simply cut it in blocks
317         ;
318         'oaep' : OAEP padding ;
319         - block_size : the size of encryption blocks. If
320         None, it is set to 'key.size // 8 - 1'.
321         '',
322
323         self.pb = key.pb
324         if key.is_private:
325             self.pv = key.pv
326
327         self.is_private = key.is_private
328
329         if padding.lower() not in ('int', 'raw', 'oaep'):
330             raise ValueError('RSA: padding not recognized.')
331
332         self.pad = padding.lower()
```

## RSA.py XX

```
332         if block_size == None:
333             self.block_size = key.size // 8 - 1
334
335         else:
336             self.block_size = block_size
337
338
339     def encrypt(self, msg):
340         """
341             Encrypt 'msg' using the key given in init.
342             Redirect toward the right method (using the good
343             padding).
344
345         - msg          : The string to encrypt.
346
347         if self.pad == 'int':
348             return self._encrypt_int(msg)
349
```

## RSA.py XXI

```
350         elif self.pad == 'raw':
351             return self._encrypt_raw(msg)
352
353     else:
354         return self._encrypt_oaep(msg)
355
356
357     def decrypt(self, msg):
358         """
359             Decrypt 'msg' using the key given in init, if it is
360             a private one. Otherwise raise a TypeError.
361             Redirect toward the right method (using the good
362             padding).
363             """
364
365             if not self.is_private:
366                 raise TypeError('Can not decrypt using a public
key.')
```

## RSA.py XXII

```
366         if self.pad == 'int':
367             return self._decrypt_int(msg)
368
369         elif self.pad == 'raw':
370             return self._decrypt_raw(msg)
371
372     else:
373         return self._decrypt_oaep(msg)
374
375
376     def _encrypt_int(self, msg):
377         """
378             RSA encryption in its simplest form.
379
380             - msg : an integer to encrypt.
381         """
382
383         e, n = self.pb
```

## RSA.py XXIII

```
385         return pow(msg, e, n)
386
387
388     def _decrypt_int(self, msg):
389         """
390             RSA decryption in its simplest form.
391             Decrypt 'msg' using the key given in init if
392             possible, using the 'int' padding.
393
394         - msg : an integer.
395
396         d, n = self.pv
397
398         return pow(msg, d, n)
399
400
401     def _encrypt_raw(self, msg):
402         """
```

## RSA.py XXIV

```
403     Encrypt 'msg' using the key given in init, using the
404     'raw' padding.
405
406     - msg : The string to encrypt
407
408     e, n = self.pb
409
410     #---Encode msg
411     if type(msg) != bytes:
412         msg = msg.encode()
413
414     #---Cut message in blocks
415     m_lst = split(msg, self.block_size)
416
417     #---Encrypt message
418     enc_lst = []
419     for k in m_lst:
420         enc_lst.append(pow(bytes_to_int(k), e, n))
```

## RSA.py XXV

```
421         return b' '.join([base64.b64encode(int_to_bytes(k))
422                           for k in enc_lst])
423
424
425     def _decrypt_raw(self, msg):
426         '''Decrypt 'msg' using the key given in init if
427         possible, using the 'raw' padding'''
428
429         d, n = self.pv
430
431         enc_lst = [base64.b64decode(k) for k in msg.split(b' ')]
432
433         c_lst = []
434         for k in enc_lst:
435             c_lst.append(pow(bytes_to_int(k), d, n))
436
437         txt = b''
```

## RSA.py XXVI

```
437         for k in c_lst:
438             txt += int_to_bytes(k)
439
440     return txt.decode()
441
442
443     def _encrypt_oaep(self, msg):
444         '''Encrypt 'msg' using the key given in init, using
445         the 'oaep' padding.'''
446
447         e, n = self.pb
448
449         if type(msg) != bytes:
450             msg = msg.encode()
451
452         # --- Padding
453         E = OAEP(self.block_size)
454         m_lst = E.encode(msg)
```

## RSA.py XXVII

```
455     """Encrypt message
456     enc_lst = []
457     for k in m_lst:
458         enc_lst.append(pow(bytes_to_int(k), e, n))
459
460     return b' '.join([base64.b64encode(int_to_bytes(k))
461                      for k in enc_lst])
462
463     def _decrypt_oaep(self, msg):
464         """Decrypt 'msg' using the key given in init if
465         possible, using the 'oaep' padding."""
466
467         d, n = self.pv
468
469         """Decrypt
470         enc_lst = [base64.b64decode(k) for k in msg.split(b' ')]
471         c_lst = []
```

## RSA.py XXVIII

```
471
472     for k in enc_lst:
473         c_lst.append(pow(bytes_to_int(k), d, n))
474
475     # --- Decode
476     encoded_lst = []
477     for k in c_lst:
478         encoded_lst.append(pad(int_to_bytes(k), self.
479         block_size, b'\0'))
480
481     E = OAEP(self.block_size)
482
483
484
485     ## - Testing
486     if __name__ == '__main__':
487         from tests import test_OAEP, test_RSA, dt
488         from sys import argv, exit as sysexit
```

## RSA.py XXIX

```
489
490     if len(argv) == 1:
491         size = 2048
492
493     else:
494         try:
495             size = int(argv[1])
496
497         except:
498             print(f'Wrong argument at position 1 : should be
the RSA key size (in bits).\nExample : "{argv[0]}\n2048".')
499             sysexit()
500
501     t0 = dt.now()
502     print('Generating a key (for all the tests) ...')
503     k = RsaKey()
504     k.new(size)
505     print('Done.')
```

## RSA.py XXX

```
506
507     test_OAEP(size // 8 - 1)
508     print(f'\n--- {dt.now() - t0}s elapsed.\n')
509     test_RSA(k, 'int', size)
510     print(f'\n--- {dt.now() - t0}s elapsed.\n')
511     test_RSA(k, 'raw', size)
512     print(f'\n--- {dt.now() - t0}s elapsed.\n')
513     test_RSA(k, 'oaep', size)
514     print(f'\n--- {dt.now() - t0}s elapsed.\n')
```

## RSA\_attacks.py |

```
1  #!/bin/python3
2  # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
3
4  '''Implementation of RSA attacks'''
5
6  ##- Imports
7  try:
8      from arithmetic import *
9      import RSA
10
11 except ModuleNotFoundError:
12     from modules.arithmetic import *
13     import modules.RSA as RSA
14
15 import math
16 from random import randint
17
18 from datetime import datetime as dt
19
```

## RSA\_attacks.py ||

```
20
21 ##-Elementary attacks
22 -----Elementary attacks
23 #---Factor modulus with private key
24 def factor_with_private(e, d, n, max_tries=None):
25     """
26         Factor modulus n using public and private exponent e and
27         d.
28
29         - max_tries : stop after 'max_tries' tries if not found
30         before. If None, don't stop until found.
31         """
32
33         k = e*d - 1
34         t, r = max_parity(k) # k = 2^t * r, r is odd.
35
36         i = 0
37         while True:
38             g = 0
```

## RSA\_attacks.py |||

```
37     while math.gcd(g, n) != 1: # find a g in  $(Z/nZ)^*$ 
38         g = randint(2, n - 1)
39
40         for j in range(t, 1, -1): # Try with  $g^{(k / 2^j)}$ 
41             x = pow(g, k // (2**j), n)
42             y = math.gcd(x - 1, n)
43
44             if n % y == 0 and (y not in (1, n)):
45                 return y, n//y
46
47         if max_tries != None:
48             i += 1
49             if i >= max_tries:
50                 return None
51
52
53     #--- Common modulus
54     def common_modulus(N, e, d, e1):
55         , , ,
```

## RSA\_attacks.py |V

```
56     Entry :
57         - N : the common modulus ;
58         - e : the known public exponent ;
59         - d : the known private exponent ;
60         - e1 : public exponent associated to the wanted
61             private exponent.
62
63             Calculate d1 the private exponent associated to e1.
64             '',
65
66             p, q = factor_with_private(e, d, N)
67             phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
68
69             return mult_inverse(e1, phi)
70
71     #---Multiplicative attack
72     def multiplicative_attack(m_, r, n):
73         ''
```

## RSA\_attacks.py V

```
74     Uses the fact that the product of two ciphertexts is
75     equal to the ciphertext of the product.
76
76     We have  $c = m^e \pmod{n}$  and we want  $m$ .
77     We ask for the decryption of  $c_ = c * r^e \pmod{n}$  ( $m_$ ).
78
79     -  $m_$  : the decryption of  $c_ = c * r^e \pmod{n}$  ;
80     -  $r$  : the number used to obfuscate the initial message
81     ;
81     -  $n$  : the modulus.
82     '',
83
84     inv_r = mult_inverse(r, n)
85
86     return (m_ * inv_r) % n
87
88
89 #-----Large message (close to n)
90 def large_message(c, e, n):
```

## RSA\_attacks.py VI

```
91     """
92     Return the decryption of c using the method from Hinek's
93     paper (cacr2004).
94     In order for this attack to work, we need to have
95     n - n^(1/e) < m < n
96     Then we have :
97     m = n - (-c % n)^(1/e).
98
99     Arguments :
100        - c : the encryption of m : c = m^e [n] ;
101        - e : the public exponent ;
102        - n : the RSA modulus.
103
104    return n - iroot(-c % n, e)
105
106
107    ##- Hastad
108    #--- Hastad (same message)
```

## RSA\_attacks.py VII

```
109     def _hastad(e, enc_msg_lst, mod_lst):
110         """
111             Return (me, e, M). The decrypted message is `iroot(me, e)
112             )` or `large_message(me, e, M)` (if the message was very
113             long).
114
115             - e           : the common public exponent ;
116             - enc_msg_lst : the list of the encrypted messages ;
117             - mod_lst     : the list of modulus.
118
119
120             The lists `enc_msg_lst` and `mod_lst` should have the
121             same length.
122             """
123
124             M = 1
125             for k in mod_lst:
126                 M *= k
```

## RSA\_attacks.py VIII

```
124     me = sum(enc_msg_lst[k] * (M // mod_lst[k]) *
125               mult_inverse(M // mod_lst[k], mod_lst[k]) for k in range
126               (len(mod_lst))) % M
127
128
129 def hastad(e, enc_msg_lst, mod_lst):
130     """
131     Return the decrypted message.
132
133     - e           : the common public exponent ;
134     - enc_msg_lst : the list of the encrypted messages ;
135     - mod_lst     : the list of modulus.
136
137     The lists 'enc_msg_lst' and 'mod_lst' should have the
138     same length.
139     """
```

## RSA\_attacks.py |X

```
140     me, e = _hastad(e, enc_msg_lst, mod_lst)[-1]
141
142     return iroot(me, e)
143
144
145 def hastad_large_message(e, enc_msg_lst, mod_lst):
146     """
147     Return the decrypted message.
148
149     - e           : the common public exponent ;
150     - enc_msg_lst : the list of the encrypted messages ;
151     - mod_lst     : the list of modulus.
152
153     The lists 'enc_msg_lst' and 'mod_lst' should have the
154     same length.
155     """
156
157     me, e, M = _hastad(e, enc_msg_lst, mod_lst)
```

## RSA\_attacks.py X

```
158     return large_message(me, e, M)
159
160
161 ##- Wiener's attack
162 def factor_with_phi(n, phi):
163     """
164     Return (p, q) such that n = pq, if possible. Otherwise,
165     raise a ValueError
166
167     - n : the RSA modulus ;
168     - phi : the Euler totient of n : phi = (p - 1)(q - 1).
169
170     It solve the quadratic
171      $x^2 - (n - \phi + 1)x + n = 0$ 
172
173     delta = (n - phi + 1)**2 - 4*n
174
175     if delta < 0:
```

## RSA\_attacks.py Xl

```
176         raise ValueError('Wrong modulus or wrong phi.')
177
178     p = (n - phi + 1 - isqrt(delta)) // 2
179     q = (n - phi + 1 + isqrt(delta)) // 2
180
181     if p * q != n:
182         raise ValueError('Wrong modulus or wrong phi.')
183
184     return p, q
185
186
187 def wiener(e, n):
188     """
189     Run Wiener's attack on the public key (e, n).
190     Return a private RsaKey object.
191
192     Can factor the key if the private exponent d is such
193     that
194          $1 < d < n^{(1/4)} / 3$ 
```



## RSA\_attacks.py XII

```
194         or
195         phi - n^(1/4)/sqrt(6) < d < phi
196
197     - e : the public exponent ;
198     - n : the modulus.
199     '',
200
201     #---Calculate the continued fraction of e/n
202     e_n_frac = get_continued_fraction(e, n)
203
204     #---Calculate the convergents
205     k_, d_ = e_n_frac.get_convergents()
206
207     #---Compute phi to check correctness
208     for i in range(1, len(k_) - 2):
209         phi = (e * d_[i] - 1) // k_[i]
210         phi2 = (e * d_[i] + 1) // k_[i] #With large private
211         exponent.
```

## RSA\_attacks.py XIII

```
212     try:
213         p, q = factor_with_phi(n, phi)
214
215     except ValueError:
216         try:
217             p2, q2 = factor_with_phi(n, phi2)
218
219         except ValueError:
220             continue
221
222         else: #Correct factorisation with p2, q2
223             key = RSA.RsaKey(e, phi2 - d_[i], n, phi2,
224             p2, q2)
225
226     else: #Correct factorisation with p, q
227         key = RSA.RsaKey(e, d_[i], n, phi, p, q)
228
229     return key
```

## RSA\_attacks.py XIV

```
230 ||     raise ValueError('The attack failed with this key')
```

## test\_attacks.py |

```
1  #!/bin/python3
2  # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
3
4  '''Tests for RSA attacks'''
5
6  ##- imports
7  try:
8      from RSA_attacks import *
9      from base import str_diff, int_to_bytes, bytes_to_int
10
11 except ModuleNotFoundError:
12     from modules.RSA_attacks import *
13     from modules.base import str_diff, int_to_bytes,
14         bytes_to_int
15
16     from secrets import randbits
17     from random import randint
18
19     ##- Fermat factorisation
```

## test\_attacks.py ||

```
19 def test_fermat_factor(size=2048, dist=512):
20     """
21     Tests the Fermat factorisation : generates two primes p,
22     q and test the algorithm on it.
23
24     - size : the size of the modulus to generate in bits, i.e
25     of p*q ;
26     - dist : the bit size of |p - q| ;
27     """
28
29     print('Prime generation ...')
30     t0 = dt.now()
31
32     p = 1
33     while not isSurelyPrime(p):
34         p = randbits(size // 2)
35
36     q = p + 2**dist
37     while not isSurelyPrime(q):
```

## test\_attacks.py |||

```
36             q +=1
37
38     print(f'Generation done in {dt.now() - t0}s.\nq : {round
39         (math.log2(p), 2)} bits\nq : {round(math.log2(q), 2)}
40         bits\n|p - q| : {round(math.log2(q - p), 2)} bits\n2 * |
41         p - q|^^(1/4) : {round(math.log2(2 * iroot(p * q, 4)), 2)
42         }')
43
44     b = q - p <= 2 * iroot(p * q, 4)
45
46     print('\nFactorisation ...')
47     t1 = dt.now()
48     a, b = fermat_factor(p * q)
49     print(f'Factorisation done in {dt.now() - t1}s.')
50
51     if a * b != p * q:
52         print('Factorisation failed : the product of the
53             result is not p * q.')
54         return False
```

## test\_attacks.py |V

```
50
51     if not (p in (a, b) and q in (a, b)):
52         print('Factorisation failed : p or q not in the
53             result.')
54         return False
55
56     print('Good factorisation.')
57
58
59
60 # #- Modulus factorisation
61 def test_mod_fact(size=2048):
62     print('Key generation ...')
63     t0 = dt.now()
64     key = RSA.RsaKey()
65     key.new(size)
66     print(f'Generation done in {dt.now() - t0}s.')
67
```

## test\_attacks.py V

```
68     t1 = dt.now()
69     try:
70         p, q = factor_with_private(key.e, key.d, key.n)
71
72     except TypeError:
73         print('not found !')
74         return False
75
76     else:
77         print('Found in {}.\nCorrect : n == pq : {}, key.p\nin (p, q) : {}'.format(dt.now() - t1, key.n == p*q, key.
78         p in (p, q)))
79         return True
80
81         # for k in (key.p, key.q, p, q):
82         #     print(k)
83 ##- Common modulus
84 def test_common_mod(size=2048):
```

## test\_attacks.py VI

```
85     print('Key generation ...')
86     t0 = dt.now()
87     key = RSA.RsaKey()
88     key.new(size)
89     print(f'Generation done in {dt.now() - t0}s.')
90
91     t1 = dt.now()
92     e1 = 0
93     while math.gcd(e1, key.phi) != 1:
94         e1 = randint(max(key.p, key.q), key.phi)
95
96     print(f'Generation of e1 done in {dt.now() - t1}s.')
97
98     t2 = dt.now()
99     d1 = mult_inverse(e1, key.phi)
100    if common_modulus(key.n, key.e, key.d, e1) == d1:
101        print(f'Attack succeeded : private exposant
recovered.\nDone in {dt.now() - t2}s.')
102        return True
```

## test\_attacks.py VII

```
103     else:
104         print(f'Attack failed : private exposant NOT
105 recovered.\nDone in {dt.now() - t2}s.')
106         return False
107
108 ##- Test Multiplicative attack
109 def test_multiplicative_attack_one_block(m=None, size=2048):
110     """
111     Test multiplicative_attack.
112
113     - m      : the message (int). If None, generates a random
114     one ;
115     - size   : the RSA key size.
116
117     """
118
119     t0 = dt.now()
120     print('Key generation ...')
121     key = RSA.RsaKey()
```

## test\_attacks.py VIII

```
120     key.new(size)
121
122     n = key.n
123     e = key.e
124     d = key.d
125
126     print(f'Done in {dt.now() - t0}s')
127
128     if m == None:
129         m = randint(1, n - 1)
130
131     c = pow(m, e, n)
132
133     t1 = dt.now()
134     print('Running the attack ...')
135     r = randint(2, n - 1)
136
137     if math.gcd(r, n) != 1: # To ensure that r is invertible
        modulo n
```

## test\_attacks.py |X

```
138     p = math.gcd(r, n)
139     q = n // p
140     print(f'We accidentally factorized n ... \nn = {n}\nnp
141 = {p}\nq = {q}.\nn == p*q : {n == p * q}.')
142     return n == p * q
143
144     c_ = (c * pow(r, e, n)) % n #obfuscated encrypted
145     message
146     m_ = pow(c_, d, n) #The inoffensive looking message (
147     obfuscated) gently decrypted by Alice
148
149     recov_m = multiplicative_attack(m_, r, n)
150
151     print(f'Attack done in {dt.now() - t1}s.')
152
153     if recov_m == m:
154         print('Attack successful')
155         return True
```

## test\_attacks.py X

```
154     else:
155         print('Attack failed')
156         return False
157
158
159 def test_multiplicative_attack(m=None, size=2048):
160     """
161     Test multiplicative_attack.
162
163     - m      : the message (int). If None, generates a random
164     one ;
165     - size   : the RSA key size.
166
167     t0 = dt.now()
168     print('Key generation ...')
169     key = RSA.RsaKey()
170     key.new(size)
171
```

## test\_attacks.py XI

```
172     n = key.n
173     e = key.e
174     d = key.d
175
176     print(f'Done in {dt.now() - t0}s')
177
178     if m == None:
179         m = randint(1, n - 1)
180
181     E = RSA.OAEP(key.size // 8 - 1)
182     m_e = [bytes_to_int(k) for k in E.encode(int_to_bytes(m))]
183     #message encoded in blocks
184     enc_lst = [pow(k, e, n) for k in m_e] #The ciphertexts
185
186     t1 = dt.now()
187     print('Running the attack ...')
188     r_lst = [randint(2, n - 1) for k in range(len(m_e))] # choose one r per block
```

## test\_attacks.py XII

```
189     for r in r_lst:
190         if math.gcd(r, n) != 1: # To ensure that all r are
191             # invertible modulo n
192             p = math.gcd(r, n)
193             q = n // p
194
195             print(f'We accidentally factorized n ...\\nn = {n}
196 \\np = {p}\\nq = {q}.\\nn == p*q : {n == p * q}.')
197
198             return n == p * q
199
200             enc_lst_r = [(c_k * pow(r_k, e, n)) % n for (c_k, r_k)
201             in zip(enc_lst, r_lst)] #List of obfuscated encrypted
202             messages
203
204             dec_lst = [pow(k, d, n) for k in enc_lst_r] #The
205             inoffensive looking messages (obfuscated) gently
206             decrypted by Alice
207
```

## test\_attacks.py XIII

```
202     recov_lst = [multiplicative_attack(m_k, r_k, n) for (m_k
203 , r_k) in zip(dec_lst, r_lst)]
204
205     decoded = E.decode([int_to_bytes(k) for k in recov_lst])
206
207     print(f'Attack done in {dt.now() - t1}s.')
208
209     if bytes_to_int(decoded) == m:
210         print('Attack successful')
211         return True
212
213     else:
214         print('Attack failed')
215         return False
216
217 ##- Test large positive numbers
218 def test_large_message(e=3, size=2048, verbose=False):
219     ,,
```

## test\_attacks.py XIV

```
220     Cf cacr2004 (Hinek) paper.  
221     Generates an RSA key, and a message m such that  $n - n^{(1/e)} < m < n$   
222     Then encrypt it :  $c = m^e [n]$   
223     It is possible to recover the message :  
224          $m = n - (-c \% n)^{(1/e)}$   
225         , , ,  
226  
227     print('Generating RSA key ...')  
228     t0 = dt.now()  
229  
230     k = RSA.RsaKey(e = e)  
231     k.new(size)  
232     print(f'Generation done in {dt.now() - t0}s.')  
233  
234     print('Generating message and encrypting it ...')  
235     t1 = dt.now()  
236     m = randint(k.n - iroot(k.n, e), k.n)  
237     c = pow(m, e, k.n)
```

## test\_attacks.py XV

```
238     print(f'Done in {dt.now() - t1}s.')
239
240     print('Recovering the message ...')
241     t2 = dt.now()
242     m_recov = large_message(c, k.e, k.n)
243     print(f'Message recovered in {dt.now() - t2}s.')
244
245     if str_diff(str(m), str(m_recov), verbose=verbose,
246     max_len=-1):
247         print(f'Attack successful. Done in {dt.now() - t0}s.')
248         return True
249
250     else:
251         print(f'Attack failed. Time elapsed : {dt.now() - t0}s.')
252         return False
253
```

## test\_attacks.py XVI

```
254  ## - Hastad
255  def test_hastad(msg = 'testing', e=3, size=2048, nb_eq=None,
256      try_large=False):
257      '''
258      Tests the 'hastad' function.
259
260      - msg          : the message that will be encrypted with
261          RSA and be recovered ;
262      - e            : the public exponent used for all the keys
263      ;
264      - size         : the size of the modulus ;
265      - nb_eq        : the number of equations. If None,
266          calculate the right number using the message ;
267      - try_large    : bool indicating if trying to break the
268          message using hastad_large_message.
269      '''
270
271
272  msg = int(''.join(format(ord(k), '03') for k in msg)) #
```

## test\_attacks.py XVII

```
267
268     n = math.ceil(e * math.log2(msg) / size)
269     print(f'Number of equations actually needed to recover
270           the message : {n}.')
271
272     if nb_eq == None:
273         nb_eq = n
274
275
276     keys = [RSA.RsaKey(e=e) for k in range(nb_eq)]
277
278     print(f'\nKey generation for Hastad\'s attack ({size}
279           bits, {nb_eq} keys) ...')
280
281     t0 = dt.now()
282     for k in range(nb_eq):
283         t1 = dt.now()
284         keys[k].new(size)
285         print(f'{k + 1}/{nb_eq} generated in {dt.now() - t1}
286           s.)
```

## test\_attacks.py XVIII

```
283     print(f'Done in {dt.now() - t0}s.')
284
285     mod_lst = [keys[k].n for k in range(nb_eq)]
286     ciphers = [RSA.RSA(keys[k], 'int') for k in range(nb_eq)]
287     enc_lst = [ciphers[k].encrypt(msg) for k in range(nb_eq)]
288
289     print('\nHastad attack ...')
290     t2 = dt.now()
291     ret = hastad(e, enc_lst, mod_lst)
292     print(f'Attack done in {dt.now() - t2}s.')
293
294     dec_out = ''.join([chr(int(str(ret)[3*k : 3*k + 3])) for
295     k in range(len(str(ret)) // 3)])
296
297     if msg != ret and try_large:
```

## test\_attacks.py XIX

```
297     # This can't work because no message can fit in [M -  
M^(1/e) ; M] : they would need to have exactly len(str(  
M))/k = len(str(M - iroot(M, e)))/k characters (where k  
is defined with the encoding used (here it is k = 3)) so  
we need that k divide len(str(M)) (thus that way it is  
possible to find an int of this length that will thus  
maybe correspond to an encoded message).  
298  
299     print('Attack failed, trying to use the large number  
way ...')  
300  
301     M = 1  
302     for k in range(nb_eq):  
303         M *= keys[k].n  
304  
305     print(f'Is the condition good for large number  
attack ? : {M - iroot(M, e) <= msg <= M}')  
306     if M - iroot(M, e) > msg:
```

## test\_attacks.py XX

```
307         print('Message is too small for the large  
message attack.')
308
309     elif msg > M:
310         print('Message is too large for the large  
message attack.')
311
312     t3 = dt.now()
313     ret2 = hastad_large_message(e, enc_lst, mod_lst)
314     print(f'Attack done in {dt.now() - t3}s.')
315
316     return str_diff(msg, ret2)
317
318     return str_diff(msg, ret)
319
320     #print(f'\nDecoded output : \n{dec_out}')
321
322 # -Test message size limit
323 def test_hastad_message_size(msg_size=100, e=3, size=2048):
```

## test\_attacks.py XXI

```
324     """
325     Test the number size with the number of equations
326
327     - msg_size : the length of the message ;
328     - e         : the public exponent used for all the keys ;
329     - size      : the size of the modulus.
330     """
331
332     msg = ''.join([chr(randint(65, 122)) for k in range(
333         msg_size)]) #Random chars
334     msg = int(''.join(format(ord(k), '03')) for k in msg)) # Encoding the message
335
336     n = math.ceil(e * math.log2(msg) / size)
337     print(f'Number of equations theoretically needed to
338         recover the message : {n}.')
339
340     keys = [RSA.RsaKey(e=e) for k in range(n)]
```

## test\_attacks.py XXII

```
340     print(f'\nKey generation for Hastad\'s attack ({size} bits) ...')
341     t0 = dt.now()
342     for k in range(n):
343         t1 = dt.now()
344         keys[k].new(size)
345         print(f'{k + 1}/{n} generated in {dt.now() - t1}s.')
346
347     print(f'Done in {dt.now() - t0}s.')
348
349     mod_lst = [keys[k].n for k in range(n)]
350     ciphers = [RSA.RSA(keys[k], 'int') for k in range(n)]
351     enc_lst = [ciphers[k].encrypt(msg) for k in range(n)]
352
353     print(f'\nHastad attack with {n} equations ...')
354     t2 = dt.now()
355     ret1 = hastad(e, enc_lst, mod_lst)
356     print(f'Attack done in {dt.now() - t2}s.')
357
```

## test\_attacks.py XXIII

```
358     if msg == ret1:
359         print('Attack succeeded : message correctly
recovered.')
360
361     else:
362         print('Attack failed : message NOT correctly
recovered.')
363         return False
364
365     if n - 1 == 0:
366         print('\nNot trying to with less equations than one.
')
367         return True
368
369     print(f'\nHastad attack with {n - 1} equations ...')
370     t3 = dt.now()
371     ret2 = hastad(e, enc_lst[:-1], mod_lst[:-1])
372     print(f'Attack done in {dt.now() - t3}s.')
```

## test\_attacks.py XXIV

```
374     if msg == ret2:
375         print('Attack succeeded : message correctly
376 recovered. So the limit is NOT correct.')
377         return False
378
379     else:
380         print('Attack failed : message not correctly
381 recovered. So the limit is correct.')
382         return True
383
384
385 def test_hastad_large_message(e=3, size=2048, less=0):
386     """
387     Tests the 'hastad' function, with large message (see
388     Hinek's paper).
389
390     - e      : the public exponent used for all the keys ;
391     - size   : the size of the modulus ;
392     - less   : the number of equations to remove.
```

## test\_attacks.py XXV

```
390
391     But the problem with this is that it generates the
392     message after having M, which is not how it would be in
393     real life.
394     '',
395
396     keys = [RSA.RsaKey(e=e) for k in range(e)]
397
398     print(f'\nKey generation for Hastad\'s attack ({size}
399         bits) ...')
400
401     t0 = dt.now()
402
403     for k in range(e):
404         t1 = dt.now()
405         keys[k].new(size)
406         print(f'{k + 1}/{e} generated in {dt.now() - t1}s.')
407
408     print(f'Done in {dt.now() - t0}s.')
409
410     M = 1
```

## test\_attacks.py XXVI

```
406     for k in range(e):
407         M *= keys[k].n
408
409         msg = randint(M - iroot(M, e), M)
410         print('len(str(msg)) :', len(str(msg)), 'log2(M) :',
411               math.log2(M))
412         print(f'Number of equations actually needed to recover
413             the message (without large message idea) : {math.ceil(e
414             * math.log2(msg) / size)}')
415         #print(f'msg : {msg}')
416
417         mod_lst = [keys[k].n for k in range(e - less)]
418         ciphers = [RSA.RSA(keys[k], 'int') for k in range(e -
419             less)]
420         enc_lst = [ciphers[k].encrypt(msg) for k in range(e -
421             less)]
422
423         print('\nHastad attack ...')
424         t2 = dt.now()
```

## test\_attacks.py XXVII

```
420     ret = hastad_large_message(e, enc_lst, mod_lst)
421     print(f'Attack done in {dt.now() - t2}s.')
422
423     if str_diff(str(msg), str(ret)):
424         return True
425
426     else:
427         return False
428
429
430 ##- Wiener
431 def test_wiener(size=2048, large=False,
432                 not_in_good_condition=False):
433     '''
434     Test Wiener's attack.
435
436     - size                      : The RSA key size ;
437     - large                     : if True, generates a large
438       private exponent ;
```

## test\_attacks.py XXVIII

```
437     - not_in_good_condition : Do not try to generate a key
438         that is breakable with this attack.
439
440     key = RSA.RsaKey()
441
442     print(f'Key generation for Wiener\'s attack ({size} bits
443         ) ...')
443     t0 = dt.now()
444     if not_in_good_condition:
445         key.new()
446
447     elif large:
448         key.new_wiener_large(size)
449
450     else:
451         key.new_wiener(size)
452
453     print(f'Key generated in {dt.now() - t0}s.)
```

## test\_attacks.py XXIX

```
454     pb = key.public()
455
456     t1 = dt.now()
457     try:
458         recovered_key = wiener(pb.e, pb.n)
459
460     except ValueError as err:
461         print(f'Wiener\'s attack finished in {dt.now() - t1}s.')
462         print(err)
463         return False
464
465
466     print(f'Wiener\'s attack finished in {dt.now() - t1}s.')
467
468     if recovered_key == key:
469         print('Correct result !')
470         return True
471
```

## test\_attacks.py XXX

```
472     else:
473         print('Incorrect result !')
474         return False
475
476 if __name__ == '__main__':
477     # test_wiener(large=True)
478     test_multiplicative_attack()
```

## tests.py |

```
1  #!/bin/python3
2  # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
3
4  '''Tests'''
5
6  ##- Import
7  try:
8      from base import *
9      from arithmetic import *
10     from RSA_attacks import *
11     from RSA import *
12     import test_attacks
13
14 except ModuleNotFoundError:
15     from modules.base import *
16     from modules.arithmetic import *
17     from modules.RSA_attacks import *
18     from modules.RSA import *
19     import modules.test_attacks as test_attacks
```

## tests.py ||

```
20
21 from datetime import datetime as dt
22
23
24 ##- Test function
25 def tester(func_name, assertion):
26     '''Print what is tested and fail if the assertion failed
27     .
28
29     if assertion:
30         print(f'Testing {func_name}: passed')
31         return True
32
33     else:
34         print(f'Testing {func_name}: failed')
35         raise AssertionError
36
37 ##- Base
```

## tests.py |||

```
38 ||| def test_base():
39     tester(
40         'base: split',
41         split('azertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbn', 3) == ['aze', 'rty', 'ui', 'pqs', 'dfg', 'hjk', 'lmw', 'x', 'cv', 'bn']
42     )
43     tester(
44         'base: split',
45         split('azertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbn', 3, '0') == ['aze', 'rty', 'ui', 'pqs', 'dfg', 'hjk', 'lmw', 'x', 'cv', 'bn0']
46     )
47
48
49 ##- Arithmetic
50 def test_arith(size=2048):
51     tester(
52         'arithmetic: mult_inverse',
```

## tests.py |V

```
53     [mult_inverse(k, 7) for k in range(1, 7)] == [1, 4,
54      5, 2, 3, 6]
55 )
56 tester(
57     'arithmetic: max_parity',
58     max_parity(256) == (8, 1) and max_parity(123) == (0,
59     123) and max_parity(8 * 5) == (3, 5)
60 )
61 tester(
62     'arithmetic: isSurelyPrime',
63     (not isSurelyPrime(1)) and isSurelyPrime(2) and
64     isSurelyPrime(11) and isSurelyPrime(97) and (not
65     isSurelyPrime(561))
66 )
67 tester(
68     'arithmetic: iroot',
69     iroot(2, 2) == 1 and iroot(27, 3) == 3
70 )
71 print('Testing fermat_factor :')
```

## tests.py ↴

```
68     tester(
69         'arithmetic: fermat_factor',
70         test_attacks.test_fermat_factor(size, size // 4)
71     )
72
73
74 ## - RSA
75 def test_OAEP(size=2048):
76     """
77     Test the OAEP padding scheme.
78
79     - size : the RSA key's size. The OAEP size is `size // 8
80     - 1`.
81     """
82
83     # Using the LICENCE file as test file
84     try:
85         with open('LICENCE') as f:
86             m = f.read()
```

## tests.py VI

```
86
87     except FileNotFoundError:
88         with open('../LICENCE') as f:
89             m = f.read()
90
91     C = OAEP(size // 8 - 1)
92     e = C.encode(m)
93
94     tester('RSA: OAEP', m.encode() == C.decode(e))
95
96
97 def test_RSA(k=None, pad='raw', size=2048):
98     '''Test RSA encryption / decryption'''
99
100    print(f'Testing RSA (padding : {pad}).')
101
102    if k is None:
103        print('Generating a key ...', end=' ')
104        k = RsaKey()
```

## tests.py VII

```
105         k.new(size=size)
106         print('Done.')
107
108     else:
109         size = k.size
110
111     C = RSA(k, pad)
112
113     if pad.lower() == 'int':
114         m = randint(0, k.n - 1)
115
116     else:
117         print('Reading file ...', end=' ')
118         # Using the LICENCE file as test file
119         try:
120             with open('LICENCE') as f:
121                 m = f.read()
122
123         except FileNotFoundError:
```

## tests.py VIII

```
124         with open('../LICENCE') as f:
125             m = f.read()
126
127             print('Done.')
128
129             print('Encrypting ...', end=' ')
130             enc = C.encrypt(m)
131             print('Done.\nDecrypting ...', end=' ')
132             dec = C.decrypt(enc)
133
134             if pad.lower() == 'oaep':
135                 # print(dec)
136                 dec = dec.decode()
137
138             print('Done.')
139
140             tester(f'RSA: RSA (padding : {pad})', dec == m)
141
142
```

## tests.py |X

```
143     ##- Run tests function
144     def run_tests(size=2048):
145         '''Run all the tests'''
146
147         t0 = dt.now()
148         test_base()
149         print(f'\n--- {dt.now() - t0}s elapsed.\n')
150         test_arith(size=size)
151         print(f'\n--- {dt.now() - t0}s elapsed.\n')
152
153         test_OAEP(size)
154         print(f'\n--- {dt.now() - t0}s elapsed.\n')
155
156         test_RSA(pad='int', size=size)
157         print(f'\n--- {dt.now() - t0}s elapsed.\n')
158         test_RSA(pad='raw', size=size)
159         print(f'\n--- {dt.now() - t0}s elapsed.\n')
160         test_RSA(pad='oaep', size=size)
161         print(f'\n--- {dt.now() - t0}s elapsed.\n')
```

## tests.py X

```
162
163     print('All tests passed.') #Otherwise the function 'tester' in the tests would have raised an AssertionError
164
165
166 ##-Main
167 if __name__ == '__main__':
168     from sys import argv
169     from sys import exit as sysexit
170
171     if len(argv) == 1:
172         size = 2048
173
174     else:
175         try:
176             size = int(argv[1])
177
178         except:
```

## tests.py Xl

```
179     print(f'Wrong argument at position 1 : should be  
the RSA key size (in bits).\\nExample : "{argv[0]}  
2048".')  
180     sysexit()  
181  
182     run_tests(size=size)
```